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Abstract
The influence of additional information on the decision making of agents, who
are interacting members of a society, is analyzed within the mathematical framework
based on the use of quantum probabilities. The introduction of social interactions,
which influence the decisions of individual agents, leads to a generalization of the
quantum decision theory developed earlier by the authors for separate individuals.
The generalized approach is free of the standard paradoxes of classical decision theory.
This approach also explains the error-attenuation effects observed for the paradoxes
occurring when decision makers, who are members of a society, consult with each other,
increasing in this way the available mutual information. A precise correspondence
between quantum decision theory and classical utility theory is formulated via the
introduction of an intermediate probabilistic version of utility theory of a novel form,
which obeys the requirement that zero-utility prospects should have zero probability
weights.
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1 Paper goal and guide
The main goal of the paper is to develop a mathematical model describing the role of
additional information received by decision makers characterized by two features. First,
the decision makers take decisions not according to the normative utility theory, but their
decisions are influenced by behavioral biases. Second, these decision makers are members
of a society, where they interact with each other by exchanging information that influences
their decisions.
To treat the first problem of including behavioral biases into decision making, we employ
the approach we recently developed, based on the use of quantum probabilities (Yukalov and
Sornette, 2008, 2009a,b,c, 2010a,b, 2011). In this approach, we employ the techniques similar
to those used in quantum theory, justifying the name “Quantum Decision Theory” (QDT).
This, however, does not require that decision makers be quantum objects, but the used
techniques just play the role of a convenient mathematical tool for characterizing behavioral
biases. It is well known that classical decision making, based on the notion of utility theory, is
plagued by numerous paradoxes caused by behavioral biases. We have shown in our previous
publications that in our approach, all these paradoxes are cured, since QDT takes behavioral
biases into account.
In our previous papers, QDT has been developed for single decision makers isolated from
others and taking decisions on the basis of their present available information. But when
decision makers are the agents of a society, they interact with each other by exchanging
information. The principal problem, we consider in the present paper, is the generalization
of the QDT approach, taking account of behavioral biases, to a society of interacting agents.
All the technical, as well as the related psychological points are carefully explained in
the following sections. However, because the mathematical methods we use may be not
customary for scholars in social sciences, in order that they would not be lost in technical
details, it can be useful to give a brief guide of the particular problems treated in each of
the sections.
In Section 2, we explain why it has been necessary to develop a novel approach in order
to avoid numerous behavioral paradoxes of classical decision making, based on utility the-
ory. We recall that the mathematical approach, we advocate, contains no paradoxes when
considering isolated decision makers. And we stress that there are other interesting phe-
nomena related to behavioral biases, when decision makers are the members of a society and
interact with each other. The most known among such phenomena is the bias attenuation
effect, when the exchange of information between the society members reduces the role of
behavioral biases.
In Section 3, we generalize QDT to the case of social decision makers, who are members
of a society and who interact with each other. Developing any novel theory, it is crucially
important to understand under what conditions it can be reduced to the known theories.
We show that classical decision theory is a limiting case of QDT, corresponding to the ne-
glect of behavioral biases in a precise sense that can be expressed rigorously in mathematical
language. It is also very important that the developed theory would not be just a mathe-
matical exercise, but that it could be applied to real-life situations and would explain them.
We illustrate this by explaining how QDT is used for removing the disjunction effect and
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conjunction error, making predictions that are in agreement with empirical observations.
In Section 4, we analyze how the information received by an agent from other members of
the society influences his/her decisions by changing the role of behavioral biases. We explain
the conjunction fallacy attenuation observed in real-life experiments.
In Section 5, we summarize the novel results of the present paper and stress the basic
problems it has solved. Some possible future experimental studies are discussed. The main
questions and related answers are explicitly listed, providing to the reader a clear under-
standing of the paper content.
2 Importance of behavioral biases in decision making
Decision theory underlies essentially all the social sciences, including economics, finance,
political sciences, psychology, and so on. It is also employed in studying the evolution of
various social systems, where the evolution equations that describe population dynamics
are constructed so as to provide the maximum of utility, or fitness, for the species of the
considered social system. Decision theory is also an important part of information technology,
including quantum information processing.
Decision makers are usually members of a society and, hence, are influenced by other
members of the society through mutual exchange of information. This is why information
processing and decision making are intimately connected with each other. Recent trends in
the interconnection of these subjects have been emphasized by Shi (2009).
The predominant theory, describing individual behavior under risk and uncertainty is
nowadays the expected utility theory of preferences over uncertain prospects. This theory,
first introduced by Bernoulli (1738) in his investigation of the St. Petersburg paradox, was
axiomatized by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), and integrated with the theory of
subjective probability by Savage (1954). The theory was shown to possess great analytical
power by Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) in their work on risk aversion and by Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970, 1971) in their work on comparative risk. Friedman and Savage (1948)
and Markowitz (1952) demonstrated its tremendous flexibility in representing decision mak-
ers attitudes toward risk. It is fair to state that expected utility theory has provided a
solid foundation for the theory of games, the theory of investment and capital markets, the
theory of search, and for other branches of economics, finance, and management (Lindgren,
1971; White, 1976; Hastings and Mello, 1978; Rivett, 1980; Buchanan, 1982; Berger, 1985;
Marshall and Oliver, 1995; Bather, 2000; French and Insua, 2000; Raiffa and Schlaifer, 2000;
Weirich, 2001; Gollier, 2001).
However, a number of economists and psychologists have uncovered a growing body of
evidence showing that individuals do not always conform to prescriptions of expected utility
theory. Moreover, human beings very often depart from the theory in predictable and sys-
tematic way. Actually, the possibility that problems could arise has already been discussed
by Bernoulli (1738) himself. Then, many researchers, starting with the works by Allais
(1953), Edwards (1955, 1962), and Ellsberg (1961), and continuing through the present,
have experimentally confirmed pronounced and systematic deviations from the predictions
of expected utility theory, leading to the appearance of many paradoxes. Neuroscience re-
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search suggests that the choice process used by human beings is systematically biased and
suboptimal (Fehr and Rangel, 2011). Among the known paradoxes of classical utility mak-
ing, we can list the Bernoulli St. Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli, 1738), the Allais paradox
(Allais, 1953), the independence paradox (Allais, 1953), the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg,
1961), the Kahneman-Tversky paradox (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the Rabin paradox
(Rabin, 2000), the Ariely paradox (Ariely, 2008), the disjunction effect (Tversky and Shafir,
1992), the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Shafir et al., 1990), the isola-
tion effects (McCaffery and Baron, 2006), the combined paradoxes (Yukalov and Sornette,
2009b, 2010b, 2011), the planning paradox (Kydland and Prescott, 1977), and dynamic in-
consistency (Strotz, 1955; Frederick et al., 2002). A large literature on this topic can be
found in the recent reviews (Camerer et al., 2003; Machina, 2008).
All paradoxes, which have been discovered in classical decision making, appear in decision
problems that can be formulated as follows. One considers a set of outcome payoffs X ≡
{xi : i = 1, 2, . . .}, on which a probability measure p : X → [0, 1] is given. Over the payoff
set, there are several lotteries, or prospects, pij = {xi , pj(xi) : i = 1, 2, . . .}, differing by
the outcome probabilities. The payoff set is the domain of a utility function u(x) that is a
non decreasing concave function. The expected utility of a lottery pij is defined as U(pij) =∑
i u(xi)pj(xi). A lottery pi1 is said to be preferable to pi2 if and only if U(pi1) > U(pi2). And
the lotteries are indifferent, when U(pi1) = U(pi2). Suppose that the given data are such that,
according to the classical decision making, a lottery pi1 is preferable or indifferent to pi2, that
is, U(pi1) ≥ U(pi2), However, decision makers, when deciding between several lotteries under
uncertainty and in the presence of risk, often choose pi2, instead of pi1, thus, contradicting
the prescription of utility theory.
Because of the large number of paradoxes associated with classical decision making,
there have been many attempts to change the expected utility approach, which has been
classified as non-expected utility theories. There exists a number of such non-expected utility
theories, among which we may mention some of the best known: prospect theory (Edwards,
1955; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), weighted-utility theory (Karmarkar, 1978, 1979; Chew,
1983), regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982), optimism-pessimism theory (Hey, 1984),
dual-utility theory (Yaari, 1987), ordinal-independence theory (Green and Jullien, 1988),
and quadratic-probability theory (Chew et al., 1991). More detailed information can be
found in the review by Machina (2008).
However, as has been shown by Safra and Sigal (2008), none of non-expected utility
theories can explain all those paradoxes. The best that could be achieved is a kind of fitting
for interpreting just one or, in the best case, a few paradoxes, while the other paradoxes
remained unexplained. In addition, spoiling the structure of expected utility theory results
in the appearance of complications and inconsistencies. As has been concluded in the detailed
analysis of Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009), any variation of the classical expected utility
theory “ends up creating more paradoxes and inconsistencies than it resolves”.
Inconsistencies between utility theory and actual decision making are caused by the as-
sumption of the classical utility theory that decision makers are rational, while in reality
their decisions are always influenced by subconscious feelings, various prejudices, and emo-
tions. Taking these subjective features into account implies the necessity of resorting to a
kind of behavioral decision making (Simon, 1955).
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Biases, such as subconscious feelings, emotions, and other subjective effects, are super-
imposed on the objective evaluation of utility, introducing some kind of indeterminacy in
decision-maker choices. The situation reminds that occurring in quantum theory, where the
physical reality is decorated by the probabilistic description of phenomena. The idea that
the functioning of the human brain could be described by the techniques of quantum the-
ory has been advanced by one of the founders of quantum theory (Bohr, 1933;1958). Von
Neumann, who is both a founding father of game theory and of expected utility theory on
the one hand and the developer of the mathematical theory of quantum mechanics on the
other hand, himself mentioned that the quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted
as decision theory (von Neumann, 1955).
The main difference between the classical and quantum techniques is the way of cal-
culating the probability of events. As soon as one accepts the quantum way of defining
the concept of probability, the latter generally becomes non-additive. And one immediately
meets such quantum effects as interference and entanglement. The possibility of employing
the techniques of quantum theory in several branches of sciences, that previously have been
analyzed by classical means, is nowadays widely considered. As examples, we can men-
tion quantum game theory (Eisert and Wilkens, 2000; Landsburg, 2004; Guo et al., 2008),
quantum information processing and quantum computing (Williams and Clearwater, 1998;
Nielsen and Chuang, 2000; Keyl, 2002).
After the works by Bohr (1933, 1958) and von Neumann (1955), there have been a number
of discussions on the possibility of applying quantum rules for characterizing the process of
human decision making (Aerts and Aerts, 1994; Segal and Segal, 1998; Baaquie, 2004, 2009;
Busemeyer et al., 2006; Bagarello, 2009; Lambert-Mogiliansky et al., 2009; Kitto, 2009;
Pothos and Busemeyer, 2010; Leaw and Cheong, 2010; West and Grigolini, 2010; Zabaletta
and Arizmendi, 2010). More references can be found in the recent review article (Yukalov
and Sornette, 2009b). However, no general theory with quantitative predictive power has
been suggested. This was the motivation for our introduction of a general quantum theory
of decision making, based on the Hilbert-space functional analysis and von Neumann theory
of quantum measurements (von Neumann, 1955), which could be applied to any possible
situations (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008, 2009a,b,c, 2010a,b, 2011). Our approach is, to
the best of our knowledge, the first theory using the mathematical formulation of quantum
theory that allows for the quantitative treatment of different classical paradoxes in the frame
of a single general scheme. Indeed, practically all paradoxes of classical decision making
find their natural explanation in the frame of the Quantum Decision Theory (Yukalov and
Sornette, 2008, 2009a,b,c, 2010a,b, 2011).
Our framework does not assume that decision makers are quantum objects. The tech-
niques of quantum theory are employed just as a convenient mathematical tool allowing us
to combine the notions of objective utility and subjective biases. Actually, the sole thing
we need is the theory of Hilbert spaces. Generally, it is worth stressing that the use of
quantum techniques requires that neither brain nor consciousness would have anything to
do with genuinely quantum systems. The techniques of quantum theory are used solely
as a convenient mathematical tool and language to capture the properties associated with
decision making. It is known that the description of any quantum system could be done as
if it was a classical system, via the introduction of the so-called contextual hidden variables.
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However, their number has to be infinite in order to capture the same level of elaboration as
their quantum equivalent (Dakic et al., 2008), which makes unpractical the use of a classical
equivalent description. Instead, quantum techniques are employed to describe systems in
which interference and entanglement effects occur, because they are much simpler than to
deal with a classical system having an infinite number of hidden unknown variables. Simi-
larly, we use quantum techniques for decision theory in order to implicitly take into account
the existence of many hidden variables in humans, such as emotions, subconscious feelings,
and various biases. The existence of these hidden variables strongly influences decision mak-
ing, as captured partially, for instance, by the notion of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955)
and confirmed by numerous studies in Behavioral Economics, Behavioral Finance, Attention
Economy, and Neuroeconomics (Cialdini, 2001; Loewenstein et al., 2008).
The standard setup displaying the paradoxes in classical decision making corresponds
to individual decision makers that take decisions without consulting each other. However,
in a number of experimental studies, it has been found that consultation sharply reduces
errors in decision making. For example, Cooper and Kagel (2005) and Blinder and Morgan
(2005) find that groups consistently play more strategically than do individuals and generate
positive synergies in more difficult games. Charness et al. (2007a,b) show that group mem-
bership affects individual choices in strategic games. Charness and Rabin (2002) and Chen
and Li (2009) investigate the minimal-group paradigm and find a substantial increase in
charity concerns and social-welfare-maximizing actions when participants are matched with
in-group members. It was found that the errors in the famous disjunction effect and con-
junction fallacy strongly attenuate when group members get information by learning from
their experience (Ku¨hberger et al., 2001) or exchange information by consulting (Charness
et al., 2010). Groups usually perform better than individuals at quantitative judgment tasks
(Sung and Choi, 2012; Schultze et al., 2012).
Explaining these attenuation effects, caused by information transfer through the inter-
actions between decision makers, requires extending the theory from isolated individuals to
human beings who are part of a society within which they interact and exchange information.
It is the aim of the present paper to generalize the QDT approach to the case of decision
makers who interact within a group or society. The information received from the society
influences the decisions. This leads to a natural explanation of the error attenuation effect,
as compared with the paradoxes existing for decisions without within-group consultations.
In the next Section 3, we present the generalization of QDT for a decision maker who is
not a separate individual, but a member of a society. In the following Section 4, we show
how the additional information, received by the decision maker through interactions with the
surrounding society, leads to a decrease of errors compared with classical decision making.
We discuss the experiments by Charness et al. (2010) and explain why the initial error in
the conjunction fallacy diminishes with the received information.
3 Social decision makers
Let us consider a society defined as a collective of several agents. Each agent is a decision
maker, whose decisions are influenced by other members of the society. A decision maker
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aims at choosing between several admissible choices, called lotteries or prospects. Note that
a decision maker can also be represented by a group jointly making a choice through a group
decision making (Xu, 2011; Tapia et al, 2012). In that case, the society is understood as a
collection of several such groups, each acting as a separate decision maker. Our aim is to
study how the choice of individual decision makers is influenced by their interactions in a
society, leading to the exchange of information.
It is necesssary to mention that decision making in a society has been considered by
invoking the techniques of statistical mechanics, following the Brock-Durlauf (1999, 2001)
approach. Statistical models are usually formulated as some variants of the Ising model,
where a node is associated with a single decision maker deliberating on a binary choice “yes-
or-now”. In that sense, an undividual decision maker possesses a classical bit of information
and acts as a subject obeying classical rules (Durlauf, 1999; Brock, 2001; Contucci, 2008;
Barra, 2010; Barra, 2012).
In the approach of Quantum Decision Theory (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008, 2009a,b,c,
2010a,b, 2011), a single decision maker enjoys quantum bits of information. This becomes
especially important and makes a principal difference with the classical way of decision mak-
ing when the considered prospects are composite. Then, even in the case of a binary “yes-no”
problem, in the presence of uncertainty, the available information is characterized by quan-
tum qubits, which leads to the appearance of interference effects. Such interference effects do
not occcur for a single decision maker dealing with a simple binary choice, if no composite
events are present. The latter situation happens in classical societies described by statistical
models. In such models, uncertainty is caused by the fact that an individual decision maker
does not know what are the decisions of other members of the society. Contrary to this, in
the quantum approach, even a single decision maker experiences uncertainty, without the
presence of any other members. This is what principally distinguishes our approach from
the classical statistical models. In our case, there exist two types of uncertainty: purely
quantum, occuring even for a single decision maker, and statistical, caused by the existence
of other members of the society.
In our previous papers (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008, 2009a,b,c, 2010a,b, 2011), we have
considered separate decision makers. For each prospect, we associate a vector in a Hilbert
space. But now, in addition to the space of mind for a given separate decision maker,
there exists the decision space of the society as a whole. Below, we give a generalization
of QDT for social decision makers. All mathematical definitions and their relation to real-
life situations have been thoroughly explained in our previous publications, and we do not
think it would be appropriate to essentially extend the present paper by repeating all those
technical details. Rigorous mathematical techniques for defining the quantum probabilities
of composite prospects can be found in (Yukalov and Sornette, 2013). In the following
sections, we give only the necessary mathematical minimum for correctly describing and
justifying the use of the prospect probabilities. The readers, who are not accustomed to the
techniques of Hilbert-space functional analysis, can omit the mathematical explanations and
can jump to the end of this section, just accepting the form of the prospect probabilities and
the rules they satisfy.
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3.1 Decision spaces
Let an agent A be a member of a society. Assume that, for this agent, there exists a set of
elementary prospects that are represented by a set of vectors {|n〉}. The elementary-prospect
vectors are orthonormalized, so that the scalar product 〈m|n〉 = δmn is a Kronecker delta.
The orthogonality of the elementary prospects means that they are independent and not
compatible, so that only one of them can be realized. The elementary prospects represent
the variety of separate possible actions that could be accomplished by the decision maker.
For instance, such possible actions could is be represented by choosing whom to marry
and what job to accept. The detailed life examples can be found in Yukalov and Sornette
(2009a,b, 2010b, 2011). Strictly speaking, the prospects are assumed to be well defined.
This distinguishes our consideration from the case of imprecise knowledge of prospects and
imprecise available information, which requires the use of the fuzzy decision theory (Aliev
et al. 2012).
The space of mind of a decision maker, by definition, is a closed linear envelope
HA ≡ Span{|n〉} (1)
spanning all admissible elementary prospects. Then the elements of the space of mind
represent all admissible combinations of various actions. Similarly, such a space of mind can
be constructed for each member of the society, the states of mind of two distinct individuals
being in general different. Let the space of mind for all members of the society, except the
agent A, be denoted as HB. Then the total decision space of the whole society is the tensor
product
HAB ≡ HA
⊗
HB . (2)
This is a Hilbert space, where a scalar product is defined. The spaceHB can also be presented
as a tensor product of the individual spaces of all other society members.
The elementary prospects serve as a basis for constructing the Hilbert space of mind. But
they are not necessarily the prospects a decision maker is evaluating. They just enumerate
all admissible possibilities. But, generally, a decision maker deliberates choosing not between
the elementary prospects, but between combinations of these. For instance, one may decide
whether to accept a particular job, under the condition of marrying either one or another
person (see details in our cited papers).
3.2 Prospect states
The decision maker A considers a set of prospects
L = {pij : j = 1, 2, . . .N} . (3)
Each prospect pij is put into correspondence to a vector |pij〉, called the prospect state, in the
space of mind HA. The prospects of L are, generally, composite objects composed of several
elementary prospects. Many concrete examples are given in the published papers (Yukalov
and Sornette, 2009a,b, 2010b, 2011).
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Being an element of the space HA, a prospect state can be represented as an expansion
over the elementary prospects,
| pij 〉 =
∑
n
〈 n | pij 〉 | n 〉 . (4)
The prospect states are not assumed to be either orthogonal or normalized, so that the scalar
product
〈 pii | pij 〉 =
∑
n
〈 pii | n 〉〈 n | pij 〉 (5)
is not a Kronecker delta. The prospects states are not orthogonal with each other, since
they are not necessarily incompatible, but can interfere and entangle with each other. And
the appropriate normalization condition will be imposed later.
The prospects are the targets of the decision maker in the sense that he/she chooses
which of them to prefer. As far as one can compare the prospects by qualifying them as
more or less preferable, the set L of these prospects pij should be ordered, forming a complete
transitive lattice. The ordering procedure will be given below. The aim of decision making
is to find out which of the prospects is the most favorable.
There can exist two types of setups. One is when a number of agents choose between the
given prospects. Another type is when a single decision maker takes decisions in a repetitive
manner, for instance taking decisions several times. These two cases are treated similarly.
3.3 Prospect operators
To each prospect pij , with a vector state |pij〉 in the Hilbert space of mind HA, there corre-
sponds the prospect operator
Pˆ (pij) ≡ | pij 〉〈 pij | . (6)
By this definition, the prospect operators are self-adjoint. These operators, generally, are
not projectors, as far as they are not necessarily idempotent,
Pˆ 2(pij) = 〈 pij | pij 〉Pˆ (pij) ,
which follows from the fact that the prospect states, generally, are not normalized. The
prospect operators are not commutative, since the expressions
Pˆ (pii)Pˆ (pij) = 〈 pii | pij 〉| pii 〉〈 pij | , Pˆ (pij)Pˆ (pii) = 〈 pij | pii 〉| pij 〉〈 pii | ,
differing by the order of operators, are not equivalent. The noncommutativity of the prospect
operators represents the noncommutativity of decisions in real life (Yukalov and Sornette,
2009a,b, 2010b, 2011).
The collection {Pˆ (pij)} of the prospect operators is analogous to the algebra of local ob-
servables in quantum theory. In the latter, as is known, not each product of local observables
is, strictly speaking, an observable. But it is always possible to define symmetrized products
so that the collection of local observables would form an algebra. In the same way as for
the operators of local observables in quantum theory, we can consider the family {Pˆ (pij)} of
prospect operators as an algebra of observables in QDT.
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Note that we use here the standard terminology related to operator algebras in Hilbert
spaces (Neumann, 1955). The operator of an observable is not, of course, an observable
quantity by itself, but it corresponds to such a quantity that is obtained by defining the
operator expected value.
3.4 Prospect probabilities
QDT is a probabilistic theory, whose observable quantities are the prospect probabilities.
These prospect probabilities are defined as the expected values, that is, averages of the
prospect operators. In that sense, the prospect probabilities play the role of the observable
quantities (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008). In our previous papers, the averages were defined
with respect to a given strategic state |ψ〉 characterizing the decision maker. Such a procedure
corresponds to the averaging over a prescribed pure state, which assumes that the considered
decision maker is an individual, not interacting with any surrounding. But when considering
a decision maker in a society, which he/she interacts with, such a decision maker cannot be
characterized by a pure state.
The society as a whole could be described by a pure wave function, with the decision
maker being a part of the society, which would then lead to the necessity of characterizing this
decision maker by a statistical operator. This is in a direct analogy with treating subsystems
of large systems by density matrices (Coleman and Yukalov, 2000). The statistical operator
characterizes the state of the system as a whole, weighting the admissible microscopic states,
in that sense being analogous to the probability distribution of classical probability theory.
Moreover, we could describe the society by a wave function only if we would assume that
the society is completely isolated from its surrounding. But such an assumption is certainly
unreasonable, since there are no absolutely isolated societies. Again, this is completely
equivalent to the absence of absolutely isolated finite quantum systems (Yukalov, 2002,
2003a,b). Thus, the most general way of describing the society state is by a statistical
operator.
In the present case, the society state, including the considered decision maker, is to be
characterized by a statistical operator ρˆAB that is a positive operator on HAB, normalized
as
TrAB ρˆAB = 1 , (7)
with the trace operation being performed over HAB. The observable quantities are to be de-
fined by the expectation values over the statistical state. Therefore the prospect probabilities
are given by the averages
p(pij) ≡ TrAB ρˆABPˆ (pij) . (8)
The prospect operators act on the space of mind HA of the decision maker. Hence the
above average can be represented as
p(pij) ≡ TrAρˆAPˆ (pij) , (9)
where the trace is over HA and the reduced statistical operator is
ρˆA ≡ TrB ρˆAB . (10)
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This operator characterizes the decision maker in the society. The reduction to the previous
situation of a single separated decision maker, as considered in our previous papers, would
correspond to the representation of the statistical operator ρˆA in the pure form |ψ〉〈ψ|, with
the state |ψ〉 being the decision maker strategic state. But, generally, the statistical operator
ρˆA cannot be represented in such a factor form, since the decision maker state is entangled
with that of the society.
Introducing the matrix elements over the elementary-prospect basis for the statistical
operator
ρmn ≡ 〈 m | ρˆA | n 〉 (11)
and for the prospect operators
Pmn(pij) ≡ 〈 m | Pˆ (pij) | n 〉 = 〈 m | pij 〉〈 pij | n 〉 (12)
makes it possible to rewrite the prospect probabilities as
p(pij) =
∑
mn
ρmnPnm(pij) . (13)
To really represent probabilities, the above quantities are to be normalized so that
N∑
j=1
p(pij) = 1 . (14)
Since the statistical operator, by definition, is a positive operator, we have
0 ≤ p(pij) ≤ 1 . (15)
This defines the collection {p(pij)} as a probability measure. The most favorable prospect
corresponds to the largest of the probabilities.
Let us introduce the utility factor
f(pij) ≡
∑
n
ρnnPnn(pij) (16)
and the attraction factor
q(pij) ≡
∑
m6=n
ρmnPnm(pij) , (17)
whose meanings will be explained below. Then, separating the diagonal and non-diagonal
terms in the sum over m and n, we obtain the probability of a prospect pij as the sum
p(pij) = f(pij) + q(pij) (18)
of the above two factors.
Though some intermediate steps of the theory might look a bit complicated, the final
result is rather simple and can be straightforwardly used in practice, provided the way of
evaluating the utility and attraction factors are known.
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3.5 Utility factors and correspondence with classical utility theory
As is known (Neumann, 1955), the expectation values of observables in quantum theory
can be separated in two terms, one having a diagonal representation over the chosen basis
and another being off-diagonal in this representation. The diagonal part corresponds to the
classical value of the observable, while the off-diagonal part characterizes purely quantum
effects caused by interference. The same holds in our case, where the prospect probability
(8) is defined as the expectation value of the prospect operator. The diagonal part is the
utility factor (16) describing the weight of the prospect calculated classically. To be defined
as a weight, the set of these factors is to be normalized as
N∑
j=1
f(pij) = 1 , (19)
from where one has
0 ≤ f(pij) ≤ 1 , (20)
since, by definition (16), the factor is non-negative.
In classical decision theory, the choice of a decision maker is based on the notion of
expected utility. One considers a set of measurable payoffs {xi} associated with the related
probabilities pj(xi) whose family forms a probability measure with the standard properties∑
i
pj(xi) = 1 , 0 ≤ pj(xi) ≤ 1 .
A prospect pij is represented by a lottery
pij ≡ {xi , pj(xi) : i = 1, 2, . . .} . (21)
Linear combinations of lotteries are defined as
∑
j
λjpij =
{
xi ,
∑
j
λjpj(xi)
}
,
with the constants λj such that∑
j
λj = 1 , 0 ≤ λj ≤ 1 .
Introducing a utility function u(x), which is defined as a non-decreasing and concave
function, one constructs the expected utility
U(pij) =
∑
i
u(xi)pj(xi) . (22)
As quantum decision theory is a more general theory than classical utility theory, it is
desirable to formulate a correspondence such that the predictions of quantum decision theory
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would reduce to those of classical decision theory in some limit to be defined. For this,
since quantum decision theory is intrinsically probabilistic, while classical decision theory
is deterministic (the prospect with the largest expected utility is assumed to be chosen
with certainty), we need to first generalize the classical utility theory to endow it with a
probabilistic skin, which itself could be reduced to the deterministic form of utility theory
under appropriate conditions. Then, the correspondence between quantum decision theory
and classical utility theory could be formulated via the probabilistic extension of the latter.
In essence, when decoherence occurs, the attraction factors in quantum decision theory tend
to zero and the prospect probabilities should tend to the utility factor of the probabilistic
version of classical decision theory. The utility factor is interpreted as the probability of
having the given utility. Note that several variants of such a probabilistic reformulation of
classical utility theory have been considered (Luce, 1958; Marschinski et al., 2007; Cadogan,
2011) by postulating the Boltzmann distribution of prospects. The latter, however, does not
satisfy the necessary boundary condition requiring that the prospect of zero utility should
have zero weight:
f(pij)→ 0 (U(pij)→ 0) . (23)
Here, we show how the correct form of the utility factor can be derived.
The most general way of deriving distributions is suggested by the principle of minimal
information allowing one to define the most accurate distribution form, given a number of
known constraints or facts, under the condition of assuming the minimum amount of addi-
tional structures in the absence of other information on the system. The relevant tool is thus
to minimize the Kullback-Leibler information function in the presence of the constraints. The
necessary first step in this procedure is the definition of a representative statistical ensem-
ble, taking into account all conditions that uniquely characterize the considered statistical
system (Yukalov, 2007).
In the probabilistic formulation of utility theory, the prospects pij are treated as random
events. Then, the prospect lattice (3) plays the role of the field of these random events. As
a consequence, the expected utility U(pij) is also interpreted as a random quantity, which,
for concreteness, is assumed to be non-negative. Therefore, there should exist a probability
measure describing the distribution of the expected utilities.
The corresponding probability f(pij) of a prospect pij is to be normalized according to
(19). We also impose that the average of the random expected utilities should exit, giving
the total utility ∑
j
U(pij)f(pij) = U . (24)
Imposing that the average utility exists as a given value U means that the decision maker
is operating under the hope of keeping his/her level of satisfaction constant. This is close
in spirit to the notion of “satisficing” introduced by Simon (1956), in which a person stops
searching and optimizing when a sufficient level of utility is reached.
The prospect that yields the maximal utility,
U(pimax) ≡ max
j
U(pij) , (25)
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plays a special role for the decision maker. In the deterministic version of classical utility
theory, it is the chosen prospect, with certainty. This suggests to normalize the utilities of
each prospect by this value taken as a reference. We thus introduce a kind of likelihood
function
f0(pij) = C
U(pij)
U(pimax)
, (26)
where C is a normalization coefficient. This function quantifies the relative value of each
expected utility in units of the maximal utility value taken as the natural reference. Here,
we capture the fact that typical decision makers ponder their options in relative terms.
Then, the utility factor f(pij) should be such as obeying the conditions (19) and (24) and
being as close as possible to the reference likelihood function f0(pij) defined by expression
(26). For this, we use the distance measure or relative information between f(pij) and f0(pij)
∑
j
f(pij) ln
f(pij)
f0(pij)
, (27)
introduced by Kullback and Leibler (1951, 1959). Note that expression (27) tends to zero as
f(pij)→ f0(pij).
The representative statistical ensemble is the pair {L, f(pij)} of the field of events, that
is, of random prospects, and of the prospect distribution f(pij), under conditions (19) and
(24), with the Kullback-Leibler relative information (27). The corresponding information
functional reads as
I[f(pij)] =
∑
j
f(pij) ln
f(pij)
f0(pij)
+
+ λ
[∑
j
f(pij)− 1
]
− β
[∑
j
f(pij)U(pij)− U
]
, (28)
where λ and β are Lagrange multipliers.
Minimizing the information functional (28) yields the distribution
f(pij) =
U(pij)
Z
exp{βU(pij)} , (29)
with the normalization factor
Z =
∑
j
U(pij) exp{βU(pij)} .
The parameter β can be called the confidence, or belief, or certainty parameter, since it
characterizes how confident is the choice of the prospect lattice. Requiring that f(pij) would
increase together with U(pij) implies that the confidence parameter is to be non-negative:
β ≥ 0. We stress that the utility factor is a normalized function of the expected utility, but
not the utility itself. This function increases together with the utility.
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In the limiting case of absolute certainty, when β →∞, we return to the completely de-
terministic choice of the prospect with the maximal expected utility, as specified by classical
utility theory:
f(pij) =
{
1, pij = pimax
0, pij 6= pimax (β →∞) .
And in the case of the completely uncertain choice of prospects, when β = 0, we come to
the form of the utility factor
f(pij) =
U(pij)∑
j U(pij)
. (30)
It is worth emphasizing that the utility factor (29) satisfies the necessary limiting condition
(23), telling that the weight (or probability to be chosen) of a prospect having no utility is
zero.
The parameter β constitutes an important ingredient in the formulation of a probabilistic
version of utility theory. We expect it to be individual-dependent. What quantum decision
theory adds is the existence of coherence and interference between prospects, which are
quantified by the attraction factors.
In summary, quantum decision theory reduces to the probabilistic version of utility theory
specified in terms of the utility factors (29) in the absence of coherence and interference
effects. These utility factors (29) give the probability that a prospect, with a given expected
utility, is chosen. And our probabilistic version of utility theory reduces to the classical
deterministic utility theory when the belief factor β tends to infinity. This concludes the
construction of the correspondence between classical utility theory and quantum decision
theory.
3.6 Attraction factors
The off-diagonal term in the expectation value (9) is the attraction factor (17) representing
quantum interference, or coherence, effects. In QDT, the attraction factor is a contextual
object describing subconscious feelings, emotions, and biases, playing the role of hidden
variables. Despite their contextuality, the attraction factors satisfy some general properties
that make possible their quantitative evaluation.
In view of normalizations (14) and (19), the attraction factors satisfy the alternation
property, such that the sum
N∑
j=1
q(pij) = 0 (31)
over the prospect lattice L is always zero, and the values of the attraction factor are in the
range
− 1 ≤ q(pij) ≤ 1 . (32)
In addition, the average absolute value of the attraction factor is estimated (Yukalov and
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Sornette, 2009b, 2011) by the quarter law
1
N
N∑
j=1
| q(pij) | = 1
4
. (33)
These properties allow us to quantitatively define the prospect probabilities (18).
We may note that the attraction factor exists only for composite prospects, composed
of several actions, while for elementary prospects this term is zero. This is easy to show as
follows. Let ej be an elementary prospect corresponding to a state |j〉, hence 〈n|j〉 = δnj.
The related prospect operator Pˆ (ej) is defined in Eq. (6). Then the prospect probability
(13) reduces to
p(ej) =
∑
mn
ρmnδmjδnj = ρjj ,
and the attraction factor is zero:
q(ej) = 0 .
In this way, there exists a direct general relation between Quantum Decision Theory and
classical decision theory, based on the maximization of expected utility. Classical decision
theory is retrieved when the attraction factor is zero. The form of the utility factor (30)
shows that, in this situation, maximizing the expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the
utility factor. Thus, classical decision theory is a particular case of the more general QDT in
the case when only objective information on the decision utility is taken into account, while
subjective sides, such as biases, emotions, and subconscious feelings play no role. The latter
variables do play a very important role in decision making performed in many important and
practical situations. Our approach takes into account both the objective utility of considered
prospects as well as their subjective attractiveness for the decision maker.
Let us briefly summarize. As we said, the attraction factor in QDT appears naturally in
order to account for subconscious feelings, emotions, and biases. Despite the fact that the
attraction factor is contextual, it satisfies three pivotal general properties: (i) an attraction
factor varies in the interval [−1, 1]; (ii) the sum of all attraction factors over the lattice of
considered prospects is zero; (iii) the average absolute value of an attraction factor is 0.25.
These properties make it possible to give a quantitative evaluation of prospect probabilities
and, thus, to develop a practical way of applying QDT to realistic problems of decision
making.
3.7 Prospect ordering
Since the prospect probability (18) consists of two terms, we should consider both of them,
when comparing the probabilities of different prospects. That is, we have to compare the
usefulness as well as attractiveness of the prospects.
The usefulness of prospects is measured by the utility factor. The prospect pi1 is more
useful than pi2, when
f(pi1) > f(pi2) . (34)
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The prospects pi1 and pi2 are equally useful, if
f(pi1) = f(pi2) . (35)
And the prospect pi1 is not less useful (more useful or equally useful) than pi2, if
f(pi1) ≥ f(pi2) . (36)
The attractiveness of prospects is characterized by their attraction factors. The prospect
pi1 is more attractive than pi2, if
q(pi1) > q(pi2) . (37)
The prospects pi1 and pi2 are equally attractive, when
q(pi1) = q(pi2) . (38)
And the prospect pi1 is not less attractive (more attractive or equally attractive) than pi2,
when
q(pi1) ≥ q(pi2) . (39)
The comparison between the attractiveness of prospects can be done on the basis of
the aversion to uncertainty and risk or ambiguity aversion (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970;
Gollier, 2001; Sornette, 2003; Malvergne and Sornette, 2006; Abdellaoui et al., 2011a; 2011b;
Yukalov and Sornette, 2011).
For example, a prospect is more attractive when:
(i) it provides more certain gain (more uncertain loss).
(ii) it promotes to be active under certainty (passive under uncertainty).
The total evaluation of prospects that finally influences the decision maker choice is based
on the prospect probabilities. The prospect pi1 is preferable to pi2, if
p(pi1) > p(pi2) . (40)
The prospects pi1 and pi2 are indifferent, when
p(pi1) = p(pi2) . (41)
And the prospect pi1 is preferable or indifferent to pi2, if
p(pi1) ≥ p(pi2) . (42)
The classification of prospects of a set L as more or less preferable establishes an order
in L making this ordered set a lattice. Among all prospects, there exists the least preferable
prospect with the minimal probability, and the most preferable prospect with the largest
probability. Hence, the prospect lattice L is complete. The lattice is also transitive since, if
pi1 is preferable to pi2, with pi2 being preferable to pi3, then pi1 is preferable to pi3.
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Decision makers may choose the most preferable prospect, whose probability is the
largest. Such a prospect is called optimal. The prospect pi∗ is optimal if and only if
p(pi∗) = max
j
p(pij) . (43)
In the presence of two criteria characterizing each prospect, a given prospect can be
more useful, while being less attractive, or vice-versa. As a consequence, there are situations
where the ordering of classical utility theory is inverted, so that the less useful though more
attractive prospect is preferred, having the largest probability. This important fact can be
formalized by the following statement.
Proposition 1. The prospect pi1 is preferable to pi2 if and only if
f(pi1)− f(pi2) > q(pi2)− q(pi1) . (44)
Proof: It follows from the comparison of the prospect probabilities (18) for pi1 and pi2.
This inequality provides an explanation for the appearance of paradoxes in classical de-
cision making as resulting from the role of the attraction factor representing the interference
between prospects caused by behavioral biases. It is remarkable that this simple idea seems
to be sufficient to remove the empirical paradoxes and make QDT consistent with the de-
cisions made by real human beings. The existence of the attraction factor is due to the
presence of risk and uncertainty associated with the choices to be made.
3.8 Binary lattice
A situation that is very often considered in empirical research consists in choosing between
two prospects, which corresponds to a binary lattice
L = {pi1 , pi2} . (45)
This case is sufficient to clearly illustrate the above general considerations.
For a binary lattice, we have
p(pi1) = f(pi1) + q(pi1) , p(pi2) = f(pi2) + q(pi2) . (46)
The normalization (19) reads as
f(pi1) + f(pi2) = 1 , (47)
and the alternation property (31) becomes
q(pi1) + q(pi2) = 0 . (48)
If the considered two prospects are equally attractive, which implies q(pi1) = q(pi2), then,
according to (48), we get q(pi1) = q(pi2) = 0. Therefore, the prospect probabilities coincide
with their utility factors, p(pi1) = f(pi1) and p(pi2) = f(pi2). In such a situation, we return to
the standard decision making recipe based on the comparison between the prospect utilities.
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But when the prospects are not equally attractive, say pi1 is more attractive than pi2, that
is, q(pi1) > q(pi2), then the alternation property (48) yields
q(pi1) = −q(pi2) > 0 .
This allows one to make accurate predictions of the choice of real human beings who have
to choose an optimal prospect.
3.9 Individual decisions
Suppose that a decision maker has to choose between several prospects. Let he/she be
assumed to make a decision sufficiently quickly, with no consultations with other members
of society, and without getting additional information from other sources. This kind of
decision making can be termed individual or spontaneous. Such a setup is typical of the
majority of experimental observations, where different paradoxes have been documented.
In the case of this spontaneous decision making, it is possible to quantitatively predict
typical decisions and, respectively, to explain the occurrence of characteristic paradoxes. This
can be done as follows. Let us consider a binary lattice of prospects. Assume that, according
to the risk-uncertainty aversion formulated above, the prospect pi1 is more attractive than
pi2, hence
q(pi1) > q(pi2) .
It is possible to estimate the attraction factors by their mean values, as explained above,
evaluating q(pi1) as equal to 1/4 and q(pi2) as given by −1/4. At the same time, the proba-
bility belongs to the interval [0, 1]. To take this into account, it is convenient to invoke the
function, called retract, such that
Ret[a,b]{z} =


a , z ≤ a
z , a < z < b
b , z ≥ b
.
Then the prospect probabilities (46) can be represented as
p(pi1) = Ret[0,1]
{
f(pi1) +
1
4
}
, p(pi2) = Ret[0,1]
{
f(pi2)− 1
4
}
. (49)
Since, the utility factors are calculated by means of formula (30), one gets a quantitative
estimate for the prospect probabilities, which makes it possible to choose the preferable
prospect.
Proposition 2. Let the prospect pi1 from a binary prospect lattice be more attractive than
pi2 and let the prospect probabilities be evaluated by expressions (49), then pi1 is preferable
over pi2 when the utility factor of pi1 is such that
f(pi1) >
1
4
(pi1 > pi2) . (50)
Respectively, the prospects are indifferent, if f(pi1) = 1/4 and the prospect pi2 is preferable,
if f(pi1) < 1/4.
Proof: It follows from expressions (49) and the condition that the prospect pi1 is more
attractive than pi2, so that q(pi1) > q(pi2).
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3.10 Comparison with empirical observations
Strictly speaking, being defined to reflect subjective factors embodying subconscious feelings,
emotions, and biases, the attraction factors are contextual. This means that their values
can be different for different decision makers. Moreover, they can be different for the same
decision maker at different times. These features seem to be natural when one keeps in mind
that we are describing real humans, whose decisions are usually different, even under identical
conditions. It is also known that the same decision maker can vary his/her decisions at
different times and under different circumstances. However, focusing solely on the contextual
character of the interference terms, gives the wrong impression of a lack of predictive power
of the approach, which would make it rather meaningless.
Fortunately, there is a way around the problem of contextuality, based on the fact that
QDT has been constructed as a probabilistic theory, with the probabilities interpreted in the
frequentist sense. This is equivalent to saying that QDT is a theory of the aggregate behavior
of a population. In other words, the predictions of the theory are statistical statements
concerning the population of individualistic behaviors, namely, QDT provides the probability
for a given individual to take this or that decision, interpreted in the sense of the fraction of
individuals taking these decisions.
The prospect probabilities, calculated in the frame of QDT, can be compared with the
results of experimental tests. In experiments, one usually interrogates a pool of M decision
makers, asking them to choose a prospect from the given prospect set {pij}. Different de-
cision makers, of course, can classify as optimal different prospects. Since the utility factor
is an objective quantity, we assume that it is the same for all decision makers. The dif-
ference between the decisions of the pool members happens because the attraction factors,
being subjective quantities, can be different for different decision makers. Here, we thus do
not need to invoke random utilities and heterogeneous expectations in the objective utility
factor (Cohen, 1980; McFadden and Richter, 1991; Clark, 1995; Regenwetter, 2001). The
heterogeneity or differences between different decision makers appears due to the presence of
the attraction factor that embodies different states of minds among the human population,
and as a function of context and time.
The experimental probability that a prospect pij is chosen can be defined as a frequency
in the following way. Let Mj agents from the total number M of decision makers choose
the prospect pij . Then, assuming a large number of agents, the aggregate probability of this
prospect is given by the frequency
pexp(pij) =
Mj
M
. (51)
This experimental probability is to be compared with the theoretical prospect probability
p(pij), using the standard tools of statistical hypothesis testing.
It is also possible to define the aggregate value of the attraction factor by the equation
q(pij) = pexp(pij)− f(pij) (52)
and to compare this with the mean values ±1/4.
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In this way, QDT provides a practical scheme that can be applied to realistic problems
for various kinds of decision making in psychology, economics, finance, and other cases, when
behavioral effects are important.
As an illustration, we have applied this theory to several examples in which the disjunc-
tion effect occurs. The latter is specified by Savage (1954) as a violation of the sure-thing
principle. A typical setup for illustrating the disjunction effect is a two-step gamble (Tversky
and Shafir, 1992). Suppose that a group of people accepted a gamble in which the player can
either win an amount of money or lose a possibly different amount. After the first gamble,
the participants are invited to gamble a second time, being free to either accept the second
gamble or to refuse it. Experiments by Tversky and Shafir (1992) showed that the majority
of people accept the second gamble when they know the result of the first gamble, whatever
its result, whether they won or lost in the previous gamble, but only a minority accepted
the second gamble when the outcome of the first gamble was unknown to them.
Another example, studied by Tversky and Shafir (1992), had to do with a group of
students who reported their preferences about buying a nonrefundable vacation, following a
tough university test. They could pass the exam or fail. The students had to decide whether
they would go on vacation or abstain. It turned out that the majority of students purchased
the vacation when they passed the exam as well as when they had failed. However, only a
minority of participants purchased the vacation when they did not know the results of the
examination.
Another example of the disjunction effect concerns stock markets, as analyzed by Shafir
and Tversky (1992). Consider the USA presidential election, when either a Republican or
a Democrat wins. On the eve of the election, market players can either sell certain stocks
from their portfolio or hold them. It is known that a majority of people would be inclined
to sell their stocks, if they would know who wins, regardless of whether the Republican or
Democrat candidate wins the upcoming election. This is because people expect the market to
fall after the elections. At the same time, a great many people do not sell their stocks before
knowing who really won the election, thus contradicting the sure-thing principle. Thus,
investors could have sold their stocks before the election at a higher price, but, abiding to
the disjunction effect, they were waiting until after the election to know its result, thereby
selling sub-optimally at a lower price after stocks have already fallen.
We have presented a detailed analysis of the above experiments (Yukalov and Sornette,
2009b; 2011). The absolute value of the aggregate attraction factor (52) was found, within
the typical statistical error of the order of 20% characterizing these experiments, to coincide
with the predicted value 0.25.
Another known paradox in classical decision making is the conjunction error. A typical
situation is when people judge about a person, who can possess one characteristic and also
some other characteristics, as in the often-cited example of Tversky and Kahneman (1980):
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also
participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is more likely? (i) Linda is a bank teller;
(ii) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. Most people answer (ii)
which is an example of the conjunction fallacy.
There are many other examples of the conjunction fallacy. For a quantitative analysis,
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we have taken the data from Shafir et al. (1990), who present one of the most carefully
accomplished and thoroughly discussed set of experiments on the conjunction fallacy. Again,
we found (Yukalov and Sornette, 2009b; 2011) that the value of the aggregate attraction
factor, within the experimental accuracy of 20%, coincides with 0.25, in excellent agreement
with the QDT quarter law.
The planning paradox has also found a natural explanation within QDT (Yukalov and
Sornette, 2009a). Moreover, it has been shown (Yukalov and Sornette, 2010b) that QDT
explains practically all typical paradoxes of classical decision making, arising when decisions
are taken by separate individuals.
4 Influence of information obtained through social in-
teractions
The standard setup displaying the paradoxes in classical decision making corresponds to
individual decision makers that take decisions without consulting each other. As has been
mentioned in the Introduction, in a number of experimental studies, it has been found that
exchange of information through consultations sharply reduces errors in decision making
compared with the prescription of classical utility theory. For instance, the errors in the
disjunction effect and conjunction fallacy strongly decrease, when group members get infor-
mation by learning from their experience (Ku¨hberger et al., 2001) or exchange information
by consulting (Charness et al., 2010).
The theory developed in the previous sections has been formulated for a decision maker
that is a member of a society. An individual decision maker is just a particular instance for
the application of the theory. The suggested general approach can also be applied to the case
of a decision maker interacting with other members of the society and receiving information
from them, which may change his/her preferences and decrease the errors typical of individual
decision makers. A decision maker, receiving information from the surrounding members of
his/her society, can be called a learning decision maker.
4.1 Learning decision maker
Let us denote by µ a measurable amount of information received by a decision maker from
the surrounding society. The amount of information can be measured by invoking some of the
known information measures (Khinchin, 1957; Arndt, 2004). For instance, information can
be represented in the form of a Kullback-Leibler information functional over a set of given
facts. The information can be received through direct interactions, that is, consultations
with other members of the society. Or each member of the society can receive information
by learning the results of other agents activity. Thus, the aggregate trades of agents in a
market produce the data characterizing this market that is then available to all and mediates
the indirect interactions between them. Learning these data gives information to each of the
traders (Barber et al., 2009).
If each member of the society gets the same amount of information µ, the state of each
member changes, hence the state of the society also varies depending on the amount of this
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additional information. The statistical state, characterizing the society, is now a function
ρˆAB(µ), which is normalized as
TrAB ρˆAB(µ) = 1 . (53)
We then follow a procedure similar to that described in Section 3. The prospect probability
is defined as before by
p(pij , µ) ≡ TrAB ρˆAB(µ)Pˆ (pij) , (54)
with the difference that we have now an additional variable µ characterizing the amount of
additional information. By convention, if the latter is set to zero, we return to the same
formulas as those presented in Section 3. Since the prospect operators act on the space of
mind HA, by defining the reduced statistical operator
ρˆA(µ) ≡ TrB ρˆAB(µ) , (55)
the prospect probability takes the form
p(pij , µ) ≡ TrAρˆA(µ)Pˆ (pij) . (56)
And in the matrix representation, we get
p(pij , µ) =
∑
mn
ρmn(µ)Pnm(pij) , (57)
with the notation
ρmn(µ) ≡ 〈 m| ρˆA(µ) |n 〉 (58)
and the normalization condition
TrAρˆA(µ) =
∑
n
ρnn(µ) = 1 . (59)
Let us introduce the evolution operator Uˆ(µ) that describes the evolution of the system
state under the varying amount of additional information µ. The initial state, before the
information exchange starts, is
ρˆAB(0) = ρˆAB , (60)
and corresponds to the situation when decision makers were still separate non-interacting
individuals.
The transformation resulting from the interactions between decision makers can be rep-
resented as
ρˆAB(µ) = Uˆ(µ)ρˆABUˆ
+(µ) . (61)
To satisfy the initial condition (60), it is necessary that the initial value of the evolution
operator Uˆ(0) be the identity operator 1ˆAB acting on HAB:
Uˆ(0) = 1ˆAB . (62)
In order for the normalization condition (53) to be valid for all µ, the evolution operator has
to be unitary such that
Uˆ+(µ)Uˆ(µ) = 1ˆAB . (63)
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Assuming that Uˆ(µ) is continuous with respect to µ, differentiating condition (63), applying
the operator Uˆ(µ) and using again (63) gives
dUˆ(µ)
dµ
+ Uˆ(µ)
dUˆ+(µ)
dµ
Uˆ(µ) = 0 . (64)
This equation for a unitary operator Uˆ(µ) can be rewritten as
i
dUˆ(µ)
dµ
= HˆABUˆ(µ) , (65)
where HAB is called the evolution generator, which is a self-adjoint operator onHAB assumed
to be invariant with respect to µ. Equation (65) yields the evolution operator
Uˆ(µ) = exp
(
−iHˆABµ
)
. (66)
This evolution operator, in view of Eq. (61), defines the variation of the total state of the
society under the varying amount of information µ.
4.2 Decision maker as a personality
The interaction of the decision maker with his/her social environment is supposed to ensure
that he/she keeps his/her distinct identity and personality while, at the same time, possibly
changing his/her state of mind. In other words, the surrounding society does influence the
decision maker state, but does so in a way that does not suppress him/her as a person taking
his/her own decisions. In modeling terms, this corresponds to the behavior of a subsystem
that is part of a larger system that changes the subsystem properties, while the subsystem
is not destroyed and retains its typical features. Such a subsystem is called quasi-isolated
(Yukalov, 2011, 2012a). Another correspondence is the influence exerted on a finite system
by an external measuring device that acts so as not to destroy the main system features,
a situation referred to as nondestructive measurements (Yukalov, 2012b). In mathematical
language, these properties are formulated as follows.
Reflecting the fact that the total system, that is considered, consists of the decision
maker, his/her surrounding society, and their mutual interactions, the evolution generator
HˆAB is represented as a sum of the corresponding three terms
HˆAB = HˆA + HˆB + Hˆint . (67)
The first term characterizes the decision maker, which implies that the operator HˆA generates
the space of mind HA by defining the basis of elementary prospects that are typical of the
decision maker, through the eigenvalue problem
HˆA | n 〉 = En | n 〉 , (68)
with the span over the basis yielding the space of mind (1). The second term, acting on the
space HB, describes the surrounding society. And the third term, acting on the total space
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HAB, corresponds to the interaction of the decision maker with his/her social environment,
associated with the process of information flow.
As mentioned above, the interaction of the decision maker with his/her social environment
is supposed to ensure that the decision maker keeps his/her identity and personality, although
possibly changing his/her state of mind. In mathematical language, this is formulated as
the following commutativity property[
HˆA, Hˆint
]
= 0 , (69)
where [a, b] ≡ ab− ba. This property, in combination with (67), is equivalent to the commu-
tativity condition [
HˆA, HˆAB
]
= 0 . (70)
Actually, these general properties are sufficient for characterizing the decision maker as a
distinct personality, and more detailed structure of the evolution generators is not important.
Let the space HB be generated by the generator HˆB through the span over the basis
formed by the eigenvectors given by the eigenproblem
HˆB | k 〉 = Bk | k 〉 . (71)
In view of Eq. (69), there exists a set of real numbers {βnk} such that the interaction term
satisfies the eigenproblem
Hˆint | nk 〉 = βnk | nk 〉 , (72)
in which |nk〉 ≡ |n〉⊗|k〉 denotes the tensorial product between the eigenvectors |n〉 and |k〉.
Then, the generator of the total system yields the eigenproblem
HˆAB | nk 〉 = (En +Bk + βnk) | nk 〉 . (73)
The above equations make it straightforward to derive the explicit expression for the
prospect probability (57). For this purpose, let us introduce some convenient notations. We
define the eigenvalue differences
ωmn = Em − En , εmnk ≡ βmk − βnk (74)
and the matrix elements
ρmn(µ) = ρmn(0) exp(−iωmnµ) , (75)
in which
ρmn(0) = 〈 m | ρˆA | n 〉 = ρmn .
We introduce the effect density describing the distribution of the impacts of the surround-
ing environment affecting the considered decision maker during the process characterizing
the transfer of information:
gmn(ε) ≡
∑
k
〈 mk | ρˆAB | nk 〉
〈 m | ρˆA | n 〉 δ(ε− εmnk) . (76)
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It is clear that the latter is normalized as∫ +∞
−∞
gmn(ε) dε = 1 . (77)
The Fourier transform of the effect density gives the decoherence factor
Dmn(µ) ≡
∫ +∞
−∞
gmn(ε)e
−iεµ dε . (78)
Finally, we come to the prospect probability (57) represented as
p(pij , µ) = f(pij) + q(pij , µ) . (79)
Here, the first term is the same utility factor as in Eq. (16). It does not depend on the
received additional information, being assumed to be an objective invariant quantity. And
the second term is the attraction factor as a function of the received information
q(pij , µ) =
∑
m6=n
ρmn(µ)Pnm(pij)Dmn(µ) . (80)
Generally, the decoherence factor can depend on the indices m,n. For simplicity, it is
possible, resorting to the theorem of average, to employ an averaged decoherence factor not
depending on the indices, which reduces the attraction factor (80) to the form
q(pij , µ) = q(pij , µ)D(µ) ,
where
q(pij , µ) ≡
∑
m6=n
ρmn(µ)Pnm(µ) .
Since the effect density is normalized as in Eq. (77), the decoherence factor D(µ), derived
from the above use of the theorem of average, with (78), enjoys the property D(0) = 1.
Therefore, at zero information, the attraction factor
q(pij , 0) = q(pij) (81)
has the properties described in Section 3.6, and we return to the initial prospect probability
p(pij , 0) = p(pij) , (82)
defined by Eq. (18).
Thus, we see that the absolute value of the attraction factor essentially depends on the
value of the decoherence factor (78).
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4.3 Attraction factor attenuation
If the surrounding society does not influence the decision maker, the effect density is given
by the delta function δ(ε). Then, the decoherence factor is constant: D(µ) = 1. That is, we
always have the same expression of the prospect probability as in Eq. (18), which is quite
clear, since getting no additional information does not change the preferences of the decision
maker.
The nontrivial situation is when the decision maker consults with other members of the
society, acquiring additional information. Interactions of the decision maker with the society
can be of different types, which defines particular forms of the effect density.
If the number of the members in the society is large, and they act on the decision maker
independently, then, by the central limit theorem, the effect density can be modeled by a
Gaussian
g(ε) =
1√
2pi γ
exp
(
− ε
2
γ2
)
, (83)
where γ is the variance of the impacts from different members of the society. Respectively,
the decoherence factor (78) is also a Gaussian
D(µ) = exp
(
− µ
2
2µ2c
) (
µc ≡ 1
γ
)
, (84)
diminishing with the increasing amount of information. Thence, the attraction factor (80) de-
creases with increasing µ, which implies the decrease of deviations from the classical decision
making and the attenuation of the related paradoxes, as has been observed in experiments
with social groups (Charness et al., 2010). The characteristic critical decoherence informa-
tion µc is smaller for larger variance of the impacts, when there are many society members
with different properties.
When the society members are not independent, the effect density can differ from the
Gaussian form. For example, it can be given by the Lorentz distribution
g(ε) =
γ
pi(ε2 + γ2)
. (85)
As a result, the decoherence factor is exponential:
D(µ) = exp(−γµ) . (86)
If the effect density is represented by the Poisson distribution
g(ε) =
1
2γ
exp
(
− |ε|
γ
)
, (87)
the decoherence factor is of the power law form:
D(µ) =
1
1 + (γµ)2
. (88)
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When the society influence is described by a uniform distribution on the bounded interval
[−γ,+γ],
g(ε) =
1
2γ
Θ(γ − ε)Θ(γ + ε) , (89)
where Θ(·) is a unit-step function, then the decoherence factor decays with oscillations as
D(µ) =
sin(γµ)
γµ
. (90)
These examples can be generalized by showing that, typically, the decoherence factor
asymptotically diminishes with increasing information, which leads to a decreasing attraction
factor and a convergence of the prospect probability to the classical form characterized by
the utility factor. This is summarized by the following theorem.
Proposition 3. Let the effect density g(ε) be a measurable function. Then, the prospect
probability p(pij , µ), under asymptotically large amount of information µ, tends to the classical
form represented by the utility factor f(pij):
lim
µ→∞
p(pij , µ) = f(pij) . (91)
Proof: Suppose the effect density g(ε) is measurable, hence being not of the delta-function
type. By definition (77), it is L1-integrable. Therefore, by the Riemann-Lebesgue lemma
(Bochner and Chandrasekharan, 1949), the decoherence factor (78) tends to zero for asymp-
totically large µ:
lim
µ→∞
D(µ) = 0 . (92)
Consequently, because of relation (80), the attraction factor also tends to zero:
lim
µ→∞
q(pij, µ) = 0 . (93)
Then, from Eq. (79) it follows that the prospect probability reduces to the classical utility
factor, as is stated in Eq. (91).
4.4 Conjunction fallacy disappearance
Charness et al. (2010) accomplished a series of experiments designed to test whether and
to what extent individuals succumb to the conjunction fallacy. They used an experimental
design of Tversky and Kahneman (1983) and found that, when subjects are allowed to consult
with other subjects, the proportions of individuals who violate the conjunction principle fall
dramatically, particularly when the size of the group rises. It has also been found that
financial incentives for providing the correct answer are effective in inducing individuals to
make efforts to find the correct answer. When individuals are forced to think, they recover
in their minds additional information that has been forgotten or shadowed by emotions. The
amount of received information increases with the size of the group. As a result, there is a
substantially larger drop in the error rate when the group size is increased from two to three
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than when it is increased from one to two (Charness et al., 2007a; 2010). These findings
confirm the earlier studies by Sutter (2005), who finds only a marginal difference between
the choices of individuals and two-person groups, but a significant difference between the
choices of two-person and four-person groups in an experimental guessing game. In any
event, the effects of group interaction are not proportional to group size. In other words, the
error attenuation decays faster than the inverse information, which is compatible with the
decoherence factors of the Gaussian (78) or exponential (80) forms. In order to determine
the exact form of the error attenuation, it would be necessary to perform a number of
experiments in which the group size or the amount of received information would be varied
over significantly larger intervals than done until now.
In the experiment by Charness et al. (2010), with groups of three members, the fraction
of individuals giving incorrect answers dropped to 0.17. It would be interesting to study
how the errors would diminish with further increase of the number of the consulting decision
makers. It is clear that the error should not disappear completely, since the amount of
received information is never actually infinite. However, there exists a critical amount of
information, when the error could be neglected. This critical value would also be interesting
to find experimentally.
5 Conclusion
We have considered the role of information received by decision makers, when the agents
interact with each other by increasing the amount of their mutual information. For this
purpose, we have generalized the quantum decision theory (QDT), developed earlier for
individual decision makers (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008, 2009a,b,c, 2010a,b, 2011), to the
case of decision makers that are members of a society. Mathematically, this corresponds
to replacing the description of strategic states of decision makers from wave functions to
statistical operators. In QDT, a choice is made by choosing the prospect that corresponds
to the largest probability, each prospect probability consisting of two terms, a utility factor
and an attraction factor. The utility factor characterizes the objective utility of prospects,
while the attraction factor represents subjective feelings, emotions, and biases. Setting the
attraction factor to zero reduces QDT to the classical decision making based on the maxi-
mization of expected utility, albeit within a probabilistic framework. So, classical decision
theory is a particular case of QDT. Real decision makers depart from the predictions of
classical utility theory, which does not take account of the attraction factor, leading to a
variety of paradoxes. But in QDT, all those paradoxes find simple and natural explanations,
since the theory accounts for the decisions of real human beings.
At an initial stage, when the decision makers of a given society have not had yet sufficient
time for mutual interactions to increase their information, the attraction factor, quantifying
the deviations from classical decision theory, is crucially important. Its aggregate absolute
value is about 0.25 on a maximum scale of 0 to 1 for the choice probabilities. It is therefore
highly significant. The occurrence of the attraction factor is due to the interference of
prospects in the decision maker brains. Since, in quantum theory, interference is necessarily
connected with coherence, it is possible to say that the decision maker is in a coherent state.
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However, the level of this coherence, and the value of the attraction factor, essentially
depend on the amount of information available to a decision maker. If, in the process
of mutual interactions between the members of the society, the amount of information of
a decision maker increases, then the attraction factor diminishes. This can be called the
decoherence process. Respectively, the prospect probabilities tend to their classical values
represented by the utility factors. This rationalizes experimental findings showing that the
deviations from classical decision making decrease when agents make decisions after receiving
additional information, for instance, by consulting with each other (Charness et al., 2010;
Sung and Choi, 2012; Schultze et al., 2012).
It is possible to imagine a situation where a decision maker receives wrong, that is
negative, information from the society members, for instance when cheating on this particular
individual. In that case, the attraction factor could increase, hence, the deviations from
classical decision making would rise. It would be interesting to perform such experiments
with decision makers getting wrong or misleading information to calibrate better the effect
density functions that are central to QDT for interacting individuals.
We would like to stress that the central point distinguishing our approach from the clas-
sical decision theory is the possibility of taking into account subjective degrees of freedom of
decision makers, such as subconscious feelings and behavioral biases. Mathematically, this
is achieved by employing the techniques of quantum theory for defining the probabilities of
prospects. This definition results in the appearance of quantum effects, such as interference,
coherence, and decoherence, modeling subconscious feelings and biases. Recall that in the
interpretation of quantum theory there exists the explanation of its statistical properties as
due to hidden variables. The standard techniques of quantum theory avoid directly dealing
with these variables, nevertheless effectively taking them into account. The same concerns
the application of quantum techniques to decision making. Using quantum techniques allows
us to effectively take into account such hidden variables as subconscious feeling and biases,
at the same time avoiding their direct description. Briefly speaking, the subjective feelings
and biases are the hidden variables of quantum decision theory, which are treated by the
techniques of quantum theory. As a result, in quantum decision theory, there appear two
characteristics, the utility factor and the attraction factor. The first is an objective charac-
teristic uniquely defined by the utility of the considered prospects. And the attraction factor
describes the subjective attitude of decision makers to the prospects. Generally, being a
subjective characteristic, the attraction factor is a random quantity. However, the employed
quantum rules allow us to find the typical value of this factor, as is explained in Sec. 3.6. The
knowledge of this expected typical value makes it possible to make quantitative predictions
for the decision maker choices.
The mathematical techniques, we have used, may be not customary for scholars in social
sciences. Therefore, to clearly state the content of this work, we list the concrete questions
posed in the present paper and the related given answers.
• Question: Why is it necessary to develop a novel approach in decision making, gener-
alizing the expected utility theory?
Answer: Classical utility theory does not take into account behavioral biases, which
leads to numerous paradoxes in decision making.
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• Question: Does quantum decision theory remove the paradoxes of classical decision
making by individual decision makers and, if so, why?
Answer: Quantum decision theory removes the paradoxes of classical decision theory
by individual decision makers by taking into account behavioral biases.
• Question: When does quantum decision theory reduce to the classical decision theory
based on the notion of expected utility?
Answer: Neglecting behavioral biases reduces quantum decision theory to the classical
decision theory.
• Question: Is it possible to give quantitative predictions in quantum decision theory
and, if so, do they agree with empirical observations?
Answer: Quantum decision theory does give quantitative predictions that are in excel-
lent agreement with empirical observations.
• Question: Why is it necessary to consider decision makers as members of a society?
Answer: In a society, decision makers interact with each other, varying by this their
available information.
• Question: How does the amount of available information influence the decisions of
social agents?
Answer: Increasing the amount of information reduces the role of behavioral biases.
• Question: Does the reduction of behavioral biases with information increase correspond
to empirical observations?
Answer: The reduction of behavioral biases with information increase is in agreement
with empirical observations, explaining the experimentally studied effects of error at-
tenuation, e.g., in disjunction effect and conjunction fallacy.
We claim that our approach of developing a “quantum decision theory” is of a radically
different type from the previous works referring to the use of quantum methods in cognitive
sciences, in the sense that we do not fine-tune a model or borrow by analogy some quan-
tum mechanical formalism to a specific decision making experiment, as often done in this
literature. In contrast, we have proposed a general formalism, based on the mathematics of
Hilbert spaces that applies to any decision making situation. We stress it that the use of
Hilbert spaces is the only main link with quantum mechanics we employ for the underlying
mathematical generalization of classical probabilities. Actually, except the functional anal-
ysis in the Hilbert spaces, we do not involve other techniques of quantum theory and our
approach does not need and does not touch at all those questionable problems of quantum
theory interpretations.
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One should not confuse the mathematical techniques we employ for calculation purpose
and the problems of interpretation concerning physical effects that we do not touch and that
have nothing to do with the aim of our approach.
In our previous papers, we have shown how our approach explains the main paradoxes and
fallacies of decision theory, such as Allais paradox, the conjunction fallacy, the disjunction
effect, and many more, without adjustable parameters. We have also predicted new effects
that makes the theory falsifiable.
We would like to emphasize that our approach, not merely qualitatively explains numer-
ous paradoxes in decision theory, but, as we have shown, provides quantitative predictions.
Summarizing, we would like to stress again the basic difference of our approach, as
compared to all previous works on this topic: (i) we use only the mathematical techniques of
Hilbert spaces, but do not invoke other physics postulates from quantum theory; (ii) we do
not need to touch the interpretation problems of quantum mechanics that have nothing to
do with our theory; (iii) our approach is principally different from all previously published
works, being general and providing quantitative predictions.
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation.
Useful discussions with E.P. Yukalova are appreciated.
32
References
Abdellaoui, M., Baillon, A., Placido, L., Wakker, P.P. (2011a). The rich domain of un-
certainty: source functions and their experimental implementation. American Economic
Review, 101, 695–723.
Abdellaoui, M., Driouchi, A., L’ Haridon, O. (2011b). Risk aversion elicitation: reconciling
tractability and bias minimization. Theory and Decision, 71, 63–80.
Aerts, D., Aerts, S. (1994). Applications of quantum statistics in psychological studies of
decision processes. Foundation of Science, 1, 85–97.
Aliev, R.A., Petrycz, W., Huseynov, O.H. (2012). Decision theory with imperfect probabil-
ities. International Journal of Information Technology and Decision Making, 11, 271–306.
Allais, M. (1953). Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des
postulats et axiomes de l’ecole Americaine. Econometrica, 21, 503–546.
Al-Najjar, N.I., Weinstein, J. (2009). The ambiguity aversion literature: a critical assess-
ment. Economics and Philosophy, 25, 249–284.
Ariely, D. (2008). Predictably Irrational. Harper: New York.
Arndt, C. (2004). Information Measures. Springer: Berlin.
Arrow, K.J. (1971). Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. Markham: Chicago.
Baaquie, B.E. (2004). Quantum Finance. Cambridge University: Cambridge.
Baaquie, B.E. (2009). Interest Rates and Coupon Bonds in Quantum Finance. Cambridge
University: Cambridge.
Bagarello, F. (2009). A quantum statistical approach to simplified stock markets. Physica
A, 388, 4397–4406.
Barber, B.M., Odean, T., Zhu, N. (2009). Systematic noise. Journal of Financial Markets,
12, 547–569.
Barra, A., Agliari, E. (2012). A statistical mechanics approach to Granovetter theory. Phys-
ica A, 391, 3017–3026.
Barra, A., Contucci, P. (2010). Toward a quantitative approach to migrants social interac-
tions. Europhysics Letters, 89, 68001.
Bather, J. (2000). Decision Theory. Wiley: Chichester.
Berger, J.O. (1985). Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis. Springer: New
York.
Bernoulli, D. (1738). Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk. Proceed-
ings of Imperial Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg, 5, 175–192. Reprinted in (1954),
Econometrica, 22, 23–36.
Blinder, A., Morgan, J. (2005). Are two heads better than one? An experimental analysis of
33
group versus individual decision-making. Journal of Money and Credit Banking, 37, 789–811.
Bochner, S., Chandrasekharan, K. (1949). Fourier Transforms. Princeton University:
Princeton.
Bohr, N. (1933). Light and life. Nature, 131, 421–423, 457–459.
Bohr, N. (1958). Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge. Wiley: New York.
Brock, W.A., Durlauf, S.N. (2001). Discrete choice with social interactions. Review of
Economic Studies, 68, 235–260.
Buchanan, J.T. (1982). Discrete and Dynamic Decision Analysis. Wiley: Chichester.
Busemeyer, J.R., Wang, Z., Townsend, J.T. (2006). Quantum dynamics of human decision-
making. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 50, 220–241.
Cadogan, G. (2011). The source of uncertainty in probabilistic preferences over gambles.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1971954.
Camerer, C.F., Loewenstein, G., Rabin, R. (Eds.) (2003). Advances in Behavioral Eco-
nomics. Princeton University: Princeton.
Charness, G., Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 117, 817–869.
Charness, G., Karni, E., Levin, D. (2007a). Individual and group decision making under
risk: An experimental study of Bayesian updating and violations of first-order stochastic
dominance. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 35, 129–148.
Charness, G., Rigotti, L., Rustichini, A. (2007b). Individual behavior and group member-
ship. American Economic Review, 97, 1340–1352.
Charness, G., Karni, E., Levin, D. (2010). On the conjunction fallacy in probability judge-
ment: new experimental evidence regarding Linda. Games and Economic Behavior, 68,
551–556.
Chen, Y., Li, S. (2009). Group identity and social preferences. American Economic Review,
99, 431–457.
Chew, S. (1983). A generalization of the quasilinear mean with applications to the measure-
ment of income inequality and decision theory resolving the Allais paradox. Econometrica,
51, 1065–1092.
Chew, S., Epstein, L., Segal, U. (1991). Mixture symmetry and quadratic utility. Econo-
metrica, 59, 139–163.
Cialdini, R.B. (2001). The science of persuasion. Scientific American, 284, 76–81.
Clark, S.A. (1995). The random utility model with an infinite choice space. Economic
Theory, 7, 179–189.
Cohen, M.A. (1980). Random utility systems - the infinite case. Journal of Mathematical
Psychology, 22, 1–23.
34
Coleman, A.J., Yukalov, V.I. (2000). Reduced Density Matrices. Springer: Berlin.
Contucci, P., Gallo, I., Menconi, G. (2008). Phase transitions in social sciences: two-
populations mean-field theory. International Journal of Modern Physics B, 22, 2199–2212.
Cooper, D., Kagel, J. (2005). Are two heads better than one? Team versus individual play
in signaling games. American Economic Review, 95, 477–509.
Dakic, B., Suvakov, M., Paterek, T., Brukner, C. (2008). Efficient hidden-variable simulation
of measurements in quantum experiments. Physical Review Letters, 101, 190402.
Durlauf, S.N. (1999). How can statistical mechanics contribute to social science? Proceedings
of National Academy of Sciences of USA, 96, 10582–10584.
Edwards, W. (1955). The prediction of decision among bets. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 50, 200–204.
Edwards, W. (1962). Subjective probabilities inferred from decisions. Psychological Review,
69, 109–135.
Eisert, J., Wilkens, M. (2000). Quantum games. Journal of Modern Optics, 47, 2543–2556.
Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 75, 643–669.
Fehr, E., Rangel, A. (2011). Neuroeconomic foundations of economic choice: recent ad-
vances. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25, 3–30.
French, S., Insua, D.R. (2000). Statistical Decision Theory. Arnold: London.
Friedman, M., Savage, L. (1948). The utility analysis of choices involving risk. Journal of
Political Economy, 56, 279–304.
Gollier, G. (2001). Economics of Risk and Time. MIT: Cambridge.
Green J., Jullien, B. (1988). Ordinal independence in nonlinear utility theory. Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty, 1, 355–387.
Guo, H., Zhang, J., Koehler, G.J. (2008). A survey of quantum games. Decision Supporting
Systems, 46, 318–332.
Hastings, N.A., Mello, J.M. (1978). Decision Networks. Wiley: Chichester.
Hey, J. (1984). The economics of optimism and pessimism: a definition and some applica-
tions. Kyklos, 37, 181–205.
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk.
Econometrica, 47, 263–291.
Karmarkar, U. (1978). Subjectively weighted utility: a descriptive extension of the expected
utility model. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 21, 61–72.
Karmarkar, U. (1979). Subjectively weighted utility and the Allais paradox. Organizational
Behavior and Human Performance, 24, 67–72.
35
Keyl, M. (2002). Fundamentals of quantum information theory. Physics Reports, 369, 431–
548.
Khinchin, A.I. (1957). Mathematical Foundations of Information Theory. Dover: New York.
Kitto, K. (2009). Science and subjectivity. Literary Parintantra, 1, 18–28.
Ku¨hberger, A., Komunska, D., Perner, J. (2001). The disjunction effect: does it exist for
two-step gambles? Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 85, 250–264.
Kullback, S., Leibler, R.A. (1951). On information and sufficiency. Annals of Mathematical
Statistics, 22, 79–86.
Kullback, S. (1959). Information Theory and Statistics. Wiley: New York.
Kydland, F.E., Prescott, E.C. (1977). Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of
optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473–492.
Lambert-Mogiliansky, A., Zamir, S., Zwirn, H. (2009). Type indeterminacy: A model of the
Kahneman-Tversky man. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 53, 349–361.
Landsburg, S.E. (2004). Quantum game theory. American Mathematical Society, 51, 394–
399.
Leaw J.N., Cheong, S.A. (2010). Strategic insights from playing quantum tic-tac-toe. Jour-
nal of Physics A, 43, 455304.
Lindgren, B.W. (1971). Elements of Decision Theory. Macmillan: New York.
Loewenstein, G., Rick, S., Cohen, J.D. (2008). Neuroeconomics. Annual Review of Psychol-
ogy, 59, 647–672.
Loomes, G., Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational choice under
uncertainty. Economical Journal, 92, 805–824.
Luce, R.D. (1958). A probabilistic theory of utility. Econometrica, 26, 193–224.
Machina, M.J. (2008). Non-expected utility theory. In: New Palgrave Dictionary of Eco-
nomics. Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (Eds.), Macmillan: New York.
Malevergne, Y., Sornette, D. (2006). Extreme Financial Risks. Springer: Heidelberg.
Markovitz, H. (1952). The utility of wealth. Journal of Political Economy, 60, 151–158.
Marshall, K.T., Oliver, R.M. (1995). Decision Making and Forecasting. McGraw-Hill: New
York.
Marschinski, R., Rossi, P., Tavoni, M., Cocco, F. (2007). Portfolio selection with probabilis-
tic utility. Annals of Operations Research, 151, 223–239.
McCaffery, E.J., Baron, J. (2006). Isolation effects and the neglect of indirect effects of fiscal
policies. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 289–302.
McFadden, D., Richter, M. (1991). Revealed stochastic preference. In: Preferences, Uncer-
tainty and Optimality. Chipman, J.S., McFadden, D., Richter, M.K. (Eds.), Westview Press:
Boulder.
36
Neumann, J. von (1955). Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Princeton
University: Princeton.
Neumann, J. von, Morgenstern, O. (1953). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.
Princeton University: Princeton.
Nielsen, M.A., Chuang, I.L. (2000). Quantum Computation and Quantum Information.
Cambridge University: New York.
Pothos, E.M., Busemeyer, J.R. (2010). A quantum probability explanation for violations of
rational decision theory. Proceedings of Royal Society B, 276, 2171–2178.
Pratt, J.W. (1964). Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica, 32, 122–136.
Rabin, M. (2000). Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: a calibration theorem. Econo-
metrica, 68, 1281–1292.
Raiffa, H., Schlaifer, R. (2000). Applied Statistical Decision Theory. Wiley: New York.
Regenwetter, M., Marley, A.A.J. (2001). Random relations, random utilities and random
functions. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 45, 864–912.
Rivett, P. (1980). Model Building for Decision Analysis. Wiley: Chichester.
Rothschild, M., Stiglitz, J. (1970). Increasing risk: a definition. Journal of Economic Theory,
2, 225–243.
Rothschild, M., Stiglitz, J. (1971). Increasing risk: its economic consequences. Journal of
Economic Theory, 3, 66–84.
Safra, Z., Segal, U. (2008). Calibration results for non-expected utility theories. Economet-
rica, 76, 1143–1166.
Savage, L.J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley: New York.
Schultze, T., Mojzisch, A., Schulz-Hardt, S. (2012). Why groups perform better than in-
dividuals at quantitative judgement tasks. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 118, 24–36.
Seetharaman, P.B. (2003). Probabilistic versus random-utility models of state. International
Journal of Research in Marketing, 20, 87–96.
Segal, W., Segal, I.E. (1998). The Black-Scholes pricing formula in the quantum context.
Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences of USA, 95, 4072–4075.
Shafir, E.B., Smith, E.E., Osherson, D.N. (1990). Typicality and reasoning fallacies. Memory
and Cognition, 18, 229–239.
Shafir, E., Tversky, A. (1992). Thinking through uncertainty: Nonconsequential reasoning
and choice. Cognitive Psychology, 24, 449–474.
Shi, Y. (2009). Current research trend: information technology and decision making. Inter-
national Journal of Information Technology and Decision Making, 8, 1–5.
Simon, H.A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
37
69, 99–118.
Simon, H.A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological
Review 63, 129–138.
Sornette, D. (2003). Why Stock Markets Crash. Princeton University: Princeton.
Strotz, R.H. (1955). Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization. Review of
Economic Studies, 23, 165–180.
Sung, S.Y., Choi, J.N. (2012). Effects of team management on creativity and financial per-
formance of organizational teams. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
118, 4–13.
Sutter, M. (2005). Are four heads better than two? An experimental beauty-contest game
with teams of different size. Economic Letters, 88, 41–46.
Tapia Garcia, J.M., Del Moral, M.J., Martinez, M.A., Herrera-Viedma, E. (2012). A con-
sensus model for group decision-making problems with interval fuzzy preference relations.
International Journal of Information Technology and Decision Making, 11, 709–725.
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1980). Judgements of and by representativeness. In: Judge-
ments Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A.
(Eds.), Cambridge University: New York, p. 84–98.
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction
fallacy in probability judgement. Psychological Review, 90, 293–315.
Tversky, A., Shafir, E. (1992). The disjunction effect in choice under uncertainty. Psycho-
logical Science, 3, 305–309.
Weirich, P. (2001). Decision Space. Cambridge University: Cambridge.
West, B.J., Grigolini, P. (2010). A psychophysical model of decision making. Physica A,
389, 3580–3587.
White, D.I. (1976). Fundamentals of Decision Theory. Elsevier: New York.
Williams, C.P., Clearwater, S.H. (1998). Explorations in Quantum Computing. Springer:
New York.
Xu, Z. (2011). Approaches to multi-stage multi-attribute group decision making. Interna-
tional Journal of Information Technology and Decision Making, 10, 121–146.
Yaari, M. (1987). The dual theory of choice under risk. Econometrica, 55, 95–115.
Yukalov, V.I. (2002). Stochastic instability of quasi-isolated systems. Physical Review E,
65, 056118.
Yukalov, V.I. (2003a). Irreversibility of time for quasi-isolated systems. Physics Letters A,
308, 313–318.
Yukalov, V.I. (2003b). Expansion exponents for nonequilibrium systems. Physica A, 320,
149–168.
38
Yukalov, V.I. (2007). Representative ensembles in statistical mechanics. International Jour-
nal of Modern Physics, 21, 69–86.
Yukalov, V.I. (2011). Equilibration and thermalization in finite quantum systems. Laser
Physics Letters, 8, 485–507.
Yukalov, V.I. (2012a). Equilibration of quasi-isolated quantum systems. Physics Letters A,
376, 550–554.
Yukalov, V.I. (2012b). Decoherence and equilibration under nondestructive measurements.
Annals of Physics (N.Y.), 327, 253–263.
Yukalov, V.I., Sornette, D. (2008). Quantum decision theory as quantum theory of measure-
ment. Physics Letters A, 372, 6867–6871.
Yukalov, V.I., Sornette, D. (2009a). Physics of risk and uncertainty in quantum decision
making. European Physical Journal B, 71, 533–548.
Yukalov, V.I., Sornette, D. (2009b). Processing information in quantum decision theory.
Entropy, 11, 1073–1120.
Yukalov, V.I., Sornette, D. (2009c). Scheme of thinking quantum systems. Laser Physics
Letters, 6, 833–839.
Yukalov, V.I., Sornette, D. (2010a). Entanglement production in quantum decision making.
Physics of Atomic Nuclei, 73, 559–562.
Yukalov, V.I., Sornette, D. (2010b). Mathematical structure of quantum decision theory.
Advances in Complex Systems, 13, 659–698.
Yukalov, V.I., Sornette, D. (2011). Decision theory with prospect interference and entangle-
ment. Theory and Decision, 70, 283–328.
Yukalov,V.I. Sornette, D. (2013). Quantum probabilities of composite events in quantum
measurements with multimode states. Laser Physics, 23, 105502.
Zabaleta, O.G., Arizmendi, C.M. (2010). Quantum dating market. Physica A, 389, 2858–
2863.
39
